Preliminary Discussions on Islamic Theology (Muqaddimah fī ʿIlm al-Tawḥīd)

Based on the Work of Imām Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Sanūsī (d. 895 AH / 1490 CE)

We begin by speaking on the preliminary discussions (muqaddimāt) of Islamic theology (ʿilm al-tawḥīd), which form the foundation for deeper theological inquiry.

The Author: Imām al-Sanūsī

Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Sanūsī (محمد بن يوسف السنوسي) was a prominent Ashʿarī theologian and Maliki jurist from Tlemcen (تلسمان), in present-day northwestern Algeria. He passed away in 1490 CE (895 AH). A master in both jurisprudence (fiqh) and theology (ʿaqīdah), al-Sanūsī authored several works with increasing levels of complexity, beginning with his Muqaddimah, a foundational text, and continuing with more advanced treatises such as Umm al-Barāhīn and Sharḥ al-Kubrā.

The Eight Preliminaries (al-Muqaddimāt al-Thamāniyah | المقدمات الثمانية)

These are foundational topics covered before entering the core tenets of Islamic belief:

Judgments (al-aḥkām | الأحكام)
Doctrinal Stance on Predestination (al-qadar | القدر)
Types of Idolatry (anwāʿ al-shirk | أنواع الشرك)
Foundations of Disbelief and Innovation (uṣūl al-kufr wa-al-bidʿah | أصول الكفر والبدعة)
Existence and Possibilities (al-mawjūdāt wa al-mumkināt | الموجودات والممكنات)
The Seven Eternal Attributes (ṣifāt Allāh al-azaliyya al-sabʿah | الصفات الأزلية السبع)
The Trustworthiness of the Prophets (al-amānah | الأمانة)
The Role of Intellect in Acquiring Creedal Knowledge (mentioned later in the extended text)

These topics are termed “preliminary” because they define the conceptual framework needed to understand Islamic creed properly. We will focus on the most relevant for our purposes.

1. The First Preliminary: On Judgments (al-Ḥukm | الحكم)

A judgment (ḥukm) is the affirmation (ithbāt | إثبات) or negation (nafy | نفي) of something, based on its correspondence to reality. If it matches reality, it is affirmed; if not, it is negated.

There are three types of judgments:

a. Rational Judgment (al-ḥukm al-ʿaqlī | الحكم العقلي)

This judgment is based purely on reason without the need for repetition or external authority. It consists of three categories:

Necessary (wājib) | واجب: That which reason deems must exist, e.g., the need for a creator.
Impossible (muḥāl) | محال: That which reason deems cannot exist, e.g., a square circle.
Possible (jāʾiz) | جائز: That which may exist or not, like most created things.

b. Customary (Empirical) Judgment (al-ḥukm al-ʿādī | الحكم العادي)

This is the judgment formed through repeated observation and experience without causal interference. It establishes a connection between two things, usually by habit, not by necessity.

For example:

Fire causes burning — though in truth, fire and burning are habitually connected, not essentially.
If there is hunger and then one drinks water, thirst is quenched — a habitual relationship, not a rational necessity.

This judgment allows for deviation (i.e., miracles [khawāriq al-ʿādah | خوارق العادة] are possible), since it doesn’t imply an absolute logical connection.

c. Legal Judgment (al-ḥukm al-sharʿī | الحكم الشرعي)

This refers to the address of the Divine Lawgiver (Allāh) directed at morally responsible individuals (mukallafūn | مكلفون), concerning their actions. It has two main categories:

Prescriptive (Taklīfī | تكليفي)

These involve commands or prohibitions and fall under five rulings:
- Wājib (Obligatory) | واجب
- Mandūb (Recommended) | مندوب
- Mubāḥ (Permissible) | مباح
- Makrūh (Discouraged) | مكروه
- Ḥarām (Forbidden) | حرام
Declaratory (Waḍʿī | وضعي)

These are indirect rulings that indicate how or whether the law applies. There are three subtypes:
- Cause (sabab | سبب): Its presence necessitates the ruling’s application.
- Condition (sharṭ | شرط): Its presence is necessary for the ruling to apply, but not sufficient.
- Impediment (māniʿ | مانع): Its presence prevents the application of a ruling.

Examples:

The time for prayer is a sabab (cause). Its presence leads to the obligation to pray.
Purity (ṭahārah) is a sharṭ (condition) for prayer. Without it, prayer is invalid—but purity alone doesn’t make prayer obligatory.
Menstruation is a māniʿ (impediment) to fasting—its presence lifts the obligation temporarily.

Understanding these distinctions helps us apply the ideas of necessity and sufficiency and the logic of presence and absence.

Here is a polished and organized continuation of your summary of al-Sanūsī’s Muqaddimah fī ʿIlm al-Tawḥīd, focusing on the second preliminary. I’ve corrected grammar and structure, integrated Arabic terms appropriately, and clarified theological and philosophical positions using both classical and contemporary frameworks.

Second Preliminary: Volition and Divine Decree

(al-Mabdaʾ al-Thānī: al-Qadr wa al-Irādah | المبدأ الثاني: القدر والإرادة)

In the second preliminary of his Muqaddimah, Imām al-Sanūsī addresses one of the most intricate and debated areas of theology: human volition (al-irādah al-insāniyyah | الإرادة الإنسانية) and divine decree (al-qadar | القدر). The core issue revolves around whether human beings have free will or whether all actions are predetermined by God.

Contemporary Framing of the Issue

To better appreciate Sanūsī’s position, we can consider how this discussion maps onto modern categories in philosophy and science:

Hard Determinism:
- Reality is fully determined.
- Human beings have no free will.
- All actions are causally necessitated by prior events, including brain states, physical laws, and environmental inputs.
Compatibilism:
- Reality is determined.
- Humans still have free will, defined as the ability to act in accordance with their desires and intentions, even if those are causally determined.
Hard Indeterminism (Incompatibilism):
- Reality is not determined (e.g., quantum or probabilistic).
- Yet humans still lack free will, because their actions are random or externally influenced, not internally autonomous.
Libertarian Free Will:
- Reality is not fully determined, and
- Humans possess true autonomous free will, meaning they can originate actions independently of prior causes.

Classical Islamic Positions

Imām al-Sanūsī, reflecting the Ashʿarī tradition, presents the classical theological positions concerning volitional human acts (al-afʿāl al-ikhtiyāriyyah | الأفعال الاختيارية). He describes three primary views:

1. The Jabriyyah (الجبرية)

They assert that all human actions are created solely by eternal divine power (al-qudrah al-qadīmah | القدرة القديمة), without any involvement of created human power.
Human beings are passive, like leaves in the wind.
There is no true human agency—everything is determined by God.
This view corresponds to hard determinism.

2. The Qadariyyah (القدرية)

They argue that discretionary human actions are created by created human power (al-qudrah al-makhlūqah | القدرة المخلوقة).
There are two ways this is understood:
- Directly: The human’s power itself originates the act.
- By generation (bi al-tawallud | بالتولد): The human act gives rise to further consequences (e.g., throwing a rock → breaking a window).
This view leans toward libertarian free will and indeterminism, emphasizing independent human agency.

3. The Ashʿarī Position (Acquisition | al-Kasb | الكسب)

Human actions occur by the eternal power of Allah, but are accompanied by a created human power that has no effective causal role—neither directly nor through generation.
The act is created by Allah, and the human being “acquires” (yaksubu | يَكْسِبُ) it at the time it occurs.
The locus (maḥall | محلّ) of this act is the human subject, but they do not create the action.
Human volition (irādah) is real, but not causative.
This aligns broadly with compatibilism, though it is grounded in metaphysical theology, not philosophical naturalism.

Clarifying Kasb (الكسب)

Kasb is the engagement of a created (but ineffective) power with the locus of action.

When someone prays, the action of prayer is created by Allah,
The person intends and acquires it,
But the act’s existence is entirely dependent on the divine will and power.

Mapping Classical to Contemporary Views

Classical View	Free Will	Determinism	Modern Equivalent
Jabriyyah	❌	✅	Hard Determinism
Qadariyyah	✅	❌	Libertarianism
Ashʿarī (Kasb)	✅ (acquisition)	✅ (creation by God)	Compatibilism (theological)
Muʿtazilah (not detailed by Sanūsī here)	✅	❌	Similar to Libertarianism

Theological Caution and Conclusion

Sanūsī—along with the wider Sunni theological tradition—emphasizes caution in probing too deeply into this matter. He quotes from Imām al-Ṭaḥāwī in his ʿAqīdah:

“The basis of Divine Decree (al-qadar) is a secret of Allah Most High within His creation. He has not revealed it to any angel drawn near, nor any prophet sent. To delve deeply into it is a cause of ruin and a step towards deprivation and transgression.”

الأصل في القدر: سرّ الله تعالى في خلقه، لم يطّلع على ذلك ملك مقرّب، ولا نبي مرسل، والتعمّق والنظر في ذلك ذريعة الخذلان، وسلّم الحرمان، ودرجة الطغيان.

Third Preliminary: Types of Shirk (Polytheism / Idolatry)

(al-Mabdaʾ al-Thālith: Anwāʿ al-Shirk | المبدأ الثالث: أنواع الشرك)

In this section, al-Sanūsī discusses six types of shirk (polytheism or idolatry), a concept central to Islamic theology. Some forms constitute kufr (disbelief), while others are major sins or bidʿah (heretical innovation).

The Six Types of Shirk:

1. Shirk al-Istiqlāl (شرك الاستقلال) – Shirk of Independence

Affirming the existence of two or more independent deities.

Example: Zoroastrians (Majūs) believed in a god of good and a god of evil.
Historically also associated with Gnostic sects in early Christianity.
Ruling: Kufr by consensus.

2. Shirk al-Taqsīm (شرك التقسيم) – Shirk of Partitioning

Ascribing divinity to parts or members of a composite god.

Example: The Christian doctrine of the Trinity.
Ruling: Kufr by consensus.

3. Shirk al-Taqarrub (شرك التقرب) – Shirk of Approximation

Worshipping others as intermediaries to get closer to Allah.

Example: The idol worship of Jāhiliyyah Arabs, claiming they brought them nearer to God.
Ruling: Kufr by consensus.

4. Shirk al-Taqlīd (شرك التقليد) – Shirk of Imitation

Blindly imitating others in worship without proof or reasoning.

Example: Later generations of Jāhiliyyah who imitated ancestral worship.
Ruling: Kufr by consensus.

5. Shirk al-Asbāb (شرك الأسباب) – Shirk of Causes

Ascribing causal efficacy to created things or natural laws independent of Allah.

Example: Philosophers or scientists who believe that natural causes operate autonomously.
Ruling:
- If one believes the causes are eternal, it is kufr.
- If one believes the causes act through a power placed in them by Allah, this is a sinful innovation (bidʿah)—some consider it disbelief, others classify it as heresy.
Relevance: A caution to modern scientists: while studying nature is permissible, believing that causes operate independently of Allah is contrary to tawḥīd.

6. Shirk al-Dawāʿī (شرك الدواعي) – Shirk of Motives

Performing actions for other than Allah, such as showing off (riyāʾ | رياء).

Ruling: A major sin, not disbelief, unless coupled with belief in the worthiness of worshipping another.
Qur’anic warning: “So woe to those who pray, yet are heedless of their prayer—those who show off.” (Sūrah al-Māʿūn 107:4–6)

Fourth Preliminary: Foundations of Disbelief and Heretical Innovation

(al-Mabdaʾ al-Rābiʿ: Uṣūl al-Kufr wa al-Bidʿah | المبدأ الرابع: أصول الكفر والبدعة)

In this critical section, al-Sanūsī outlines seven foundational causes that lead to kufr (disbelief) and bidʿah (innovation). These principles help explain how erroneous beliefs develop and how to avoid theological pitfalls.

The Seven Foundations of Kufr and Bidʿah:

1. Attribution of Necessary Existence Without Choice

Believing Allah acts out of necessity, like a natural force (ṭabīʿah | طبيعة), not by will (irādah | إرادة).
Denies Allah’s free will, implying He must act, which is invalid.
Relevance: A critique of deterministic or deist cosmologies.

2. Rational Determination of Divine Acts

Asserting that Allah’s actions are driven by motives rather than wisdom (ḥikmah | حكمة).
Difference: Wisdom is voluntary and intrinsic, motive implies need or compulsion.
Relevance: Refutes those who claim God “needed” to create or “must” act in certain ways.

3. Blind Imitation (Taqlīd) Without Reason

Following others (e.g., ancestors or social groups) without evidence or inquiry.
A common reason for disbelief in history: “We found our fathers doing so…” (Qur’an 43:22)
Relevance: Warns against inherited beliefs that conflict with revealed truth.

4. Mistaking Habitual Connections as Necessary

Assuming that repetition implies a necessary link (e.g., fire must cause burning).
Confuses ʿādah (custom) with ʿaql (rational necessity).
Leads to naturalistic assumptions excluding Allah from causal chains.
Same error as in Shirk al-Asbāb (above).

5. Compound Ignorance (al-Jahl al-Murakkab | الجهل المركب)

Being unaware of the truth and unaware that one is unaware.
More dangerous than simple ignorance (jahl basīṭ), as it closes the door to correction.

6. Literalism Without Rational Principles

Interpreting Qur’anic or prophetic language literally, even when doing so leads to impossible meanings.
Example: Asserting that Allah has a body (jism | جسم) leads to belief that He exists in space and time, which contradicts His eternality (qidam | قدم) and *transcendence (tanzīh | تنزيه).
Correct method: Distinguish between literal impossibility and metaphorical acceptability.

7. Ignorance of Rational Principles and Arabic Rhetoric

Misunderstanding texts due to lack of training in:
- Logic (manṭiq | منطق)
- Arabic language, especially balāghah (rhetoric)
Example: Misreading Sūrah al-Nisāʾ (4:171):

“O People of the Book! Do not go to excess in your religion… The Messiah, ʿĪsā ibn Maryam, is only a Messenger of Allah and His Word conveyed to Mary, and a spirit from Him.”
- Misinterpreting “a word from Him” or “a spirit from Him” as implying divinity rather than honorific metaphor.

Rules of Interpretation (al-Taʾwīl | التأويل)

If the literal meaning of a verse contradicts reason or foundational creed, it must be interpreted.
If the meaning is ambiguous, then:
1. Accept it without interpretation (the way of many Salaf), or
2. Interpret it using sound Arabic, logic, and early scholarly methods (the way of many Khalaf).
Both are valid approaches when guided by principles of tafsīr and ʿaqīdah.

Conclusion: Why These Preliminaries Matter Today

These two preliminaries—on shirk and the roots of kufr and bidʿah—are essential to navigate modern intellectual and spiritual challenges. Whether confronting:

Naturalism in science,
Blind traditionalism in culture,
Superficial literalism in interpretation,
Or philosophical confusion in free will debates,